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Highlights: 
• OM-constructions are not agnate with If-conditionals, although both may express a condition;  
• OM-constructions differ from If-conditionals and CCs in how they are embedded in context; 
• Interpersonal function is the key to differentiating potential readings of the OM-construction; 
• Prototypical ‘and’ is exploited in OM-constructions in both hypotactic and paratactic expansion. 
 
Abstract 
In traditional grammar, and is a prototypical paratactic additive conjunction, and yet when occurring 
in the OM-construction (the one more construction), this status is challenged because in these cases it 
represents an indeterminate or vague syntactic and semantic relation (e.g., Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). 
This paper discusses OM-constructions from a functional approach with the aim of resolving this 
indeterminacy and explaining the meaning potential they realised. Drawing on both attested examples 
from the BNC and the enTenTen15 corpora and examples from existing literature, we analyse a range of 
instances of the OM-construction, and we compare them to related constructions (e.g., pseudo-
imperatives, if-conditionals).  We draw three main conclusions: (1) the OM-construction constitutes a 
clause complex which construes a sequence of figures, where the nominal form of the OM-construction 
may be an elliptical clause; (2) the non-canonical uses of and evolved from the prototypical additive 
conjunction and, where interpersonal speech functions play a key role in differentiating potential 
readings of the OM-construction; and (3) uses of and in the OM-construction function not only to link a 
paratactic sequence but also a hypotactic one, where and is also used to express sequential, causal and 
conditional enhancement.     
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1. Introduction1 
 
In this paper, we explore what Culicover (1972) calls OM-constructions, illustrated 
in example (1), where OM is a shortening of one more since the representative example 
of these constructions begins with the phrase ‘one more’. The OM-construction takes 
 
1 We aƌe gƌateful to MiĐhelle Aldƌidge, Akila Sellaŵi-Baklouti aŶd aŶoŶǇŵous ƌeǀieǁeƌs foƌ ĐoŵŵeŶts aŶd 
suggestioŶs oŶ eaƌlieƌ ǀeƌsioŶs ǁhiĐh haǀe iŵpƌoǀed the ƋualitǇ of this papeƌ. All shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs aƌe, of Đouƌse, ouƌ 
oǁŶ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ.  
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the form: ‘NP and S’ (Culicover 1972:199).  
(1) One more can of beer and I’m leaving.                  (Culicover 1972:199) 
OM-constructions present a challenge to existing accounts of conjunctions because 
they represent systematic ambiguity in terms of the syntactic and semantic relations of 
conjuncts combined by the conjunction and. Traditionally, and, or, but are linkers 
which coordinate clauses while because, if are binders used to combine clauses through 
subordination. When it comes to OM-constructions, however, the functions of and are 
less clear. According to Culicover (1972:209), example (1) is ‘indeterminate or vague’, 
given that it may express three different meanings as shown in example (1), a-c (from 
Culicover 1972:200).  
(1a)  If you drink one more can of beer I’m leaving.                
(1b)  After I drink one more can of beer I’m leaving.                  
(1c)  In spite of the fact that there is one more can of beer here, I’m leaving.                                                           
  In this paper, our aim is to propose a novel account of the and-OM-construction2 by 
examining it from a functional perspective and by describing and explaining its  
meaning potential. This paper highlights the multifunctionality of language and the 
important role that context of situation (Halliday & Hasan 1985) plays in explaining 
the clause combining that can be identified in OM-constructions.  
In order to carry out this study, we draw on data taken mainly from existing corpora, 
with examples retrieved from the British National Corpus (BNC) and English Web 
Corpus 2015 (enTenTen15), using the SketchEngine platform (Kilgarriff et al. 2014). 
These corpora were used to ensure as wide a selection as possible since both corpora 
are very large, 100 million words and 15 billion words respectively. With a query for 
the phrase ‘one more’ followed by ‘and’, we obtained 20 hits from BNC and 55 hits 
from EnTenten15, giving a total of 75 examples, which suggests that the construction 
has a very low frequency in these corpora3. In addition to these corpus examples, we 
have also complemented our discussion with relevant data from published studies 
where appropriate.  
The next section presents an overview of the main syntactic and semantic issues and 
points of debate related to OM-constructions generally, where we outline the main 
outstanding issues and establish the key contributions we make in this paper. In section 
3, we consider a functional perspective on this construction by first drawing on the 
framework of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) to describe the grammatical nature 
of the OM-construction. We examine one particular example in detail to show not only 
that the first part of the construction is a clause expressed by a type of nominal group 
but also that context and phoricity play an important role in how this construction 
works. We also use additional examples to complement this description and identify 
 
2 While OM-constructions include a wide range of related and/or constructions, in this paper, we mainly discuss 
and-OM-constructions. 
3 Despite this loǁ fƌeƋueŶĐǇ, these eǆpƌessioŶs seeŵ iŶtuitiǀelǇ ǀeƌǇ ĐoŵŵoŶ. 
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the key features of the construction. Here we show how SFL offers a framework that 
allows us to develop a promising approach to some of the challenges outlined in section 
2. Section 4, still drawing on the SFL framework, proposes a new account of the logical 
semantics construed by and in the OM-construction. Drawing on the case built in 
section 3, we also argue that OM-constructions cannot be equated with If-conditionals, 
despite some obvious similarities. In terms of expansion, in addition to extending and 
temporal enhancing paratactic OM-constructions, we have found that conditional 
enhancing expansion may be either paratactic or hypotactic, depending on whether or 
not the clause in the protasis realizes a certain speech function. The paper ends with a 
brief section highlighting our conclusions and showing how our holistic account has 
enabled us to offer promising new insight on this perplexing construction.   
 
2. Syntactic and semantic perspectives on OM-constructions 
 
OM-constructions have been discussed by a variety of scholars (Jespersen 1909; 
Culicover 1970, 1972; Culicover & Jackendoff 1997; Quirk et al. 1985; Russell 
2007㸹Franke, 2008; and for French, Roig & van Raemdonck, 20174), most of whom 
focus on the conditional use of the conjunction and. The initial discussion of OM-
constructions is attributed to Jespersen (1909), who notes that when a noun phrase 
conjoins with a full sentence, as in example (2a), it can express a conditional meaning 
as shown in (2b) since the meaning of (2a) is seen as roughly equivalent to (2b). 
(2a)  One more word of your sauce, and I’ll call you down and fight you. 
                                                   (Stevenson 1884: 244)  
(2b)  If you give me one more word of your sauce, then I’ll call you down and fight 
you.                                             (Keshet 2013:213) 
Culicover (1972:216) explains that typical OM-sentences, as we saw in example 
(1), have three interpretations which are presented here in (3), each corresponding to 
examples (1a) to (1c) above. He claims that the ambiguity of the OM-construction 
arises from three different readings of the conjunction and, which he labels as 
consequential (3a), sequential (3b) and juxtapositional (3c).  
(3)  a. If...NP..., then S.          consequential 
b. After...NP..., then S.         sequential 
c. ... NP  ...,  and  (surprisingly) S!      juxtapositional 
                    but                                                
It is worth pointing out that the juxtapositional reading has two variables: pure 
juxtaposition and linked juxtaposition or incongruency, illustrated in (4) and (5) 
 
4 See Roig & van Raemdonck 2017 for work on French in relation to this construction, e.g., “Une seule goutte de 
ce parfum et les hommes mourront pour toi” (ibid.: 67) [our translation: ‘A single drop of this perfume and men 
would die for you']   
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respectively. For Culicover, incongruency is seen as a sub-type of juxtaposition because 
abnormal stress is required to indicate the exceptionality which is associated with the 
juxtaposition.  
(4)  My only pen and you went and lost it.                   (Culicover 1970:368) 
(5)  Twenty-five centuries of language teaching and we have learned nothing. (ibid.)                               
Three constraints for and-OM-sentences were identified by Culicover (1972:205): 
(i) the first bare NP conjunct describes an event involving the NP; (2) the second full 
sentence conjunct also represents an event; and (c) there is a certain logical relation 
between the two events, e.g., temporality, cause-effect, or ‘a mental relationship 
expressed by the incongruence reading’. Culicover (2013:16), commenting on his 1972 
paper, states that the reading of the elliptical construction results from ‘rules of 
interpretation and inference, operating over the interpretation of fragments in relation 
to antecedent syntactic structure and discourse structure’. For Culicover (ibid.:15):  
OM-sentences are instances of a particular construction whose interpretation 
is constrained by the form, but not fully specified by the form. It follows that 
the connectivity must be mediated by the semantics and pragmatics.          
Culicover (1972) sheds light on the grammatical and semantic characteristics of the 
relationship between the understood role of the NP and the acceptability of the sentence. 
He also suggests that the thematic relations of the NPs might be helpful, however, what 
is not clear is how OM-sentences relate to their local environment (i.e., co-text) and to 
the extra-linguistic environment. While Thumm (2000) provides a useful account of the 
contextualization and framing of paratactic conditionals, the OM-construction is not 
discussed in any detail. Given the significant status of systemic functional linguistics 
(SFL) in the area of text linguistics broadly speaking (Butler & Gonzálvez-García 
2014), it is our hope that this paper will provide an important first step in developing 
such an account (see section 3 below). 
Turning our attention to the conjunction and, accounts of the relation it introduces 
have generally concentrated on the distinction between co-ordination and 
subordination. While Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) argue that the use of LSand in 
these constructions does involve syntactic coordination, they nevertheless propose that 
there is a divergence between syntactic structure and conceptual representation. They 
conclude that and is best seen as conceptual subordination. It is this feature, then, that 
distinguishes LSand from coordinating and (andc), illustrated in example (6a) – (6c). 
This position differs from previous views on these constructions such as paratactic 
conditionals (Haiman 1983) or coordinate conditionals (Lakoff 1986). 
(6a)  Another picture of himselfi appears in the newspaper LSand Susan thinks Johni 
will definitely go out and get a lawyer.          LSand with an IP-conjunction 
(6b)  Another picture of himselfi in the newspaper LSand Susan thinks Johni will 
definitely go out and get a lawyer.              LSand with an OM-sentence 
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(6c)  If another picture of himselfi appears in the newspaper, Susan thinks Johni will 
definitely go out and get a lawyer.                        If-construction 
                                           (Culicover & Jackendoff 1997:201)  
The OM-construction is described by Culicover & Jackendoff (1997: 201) as ‘a case 
closely related in its semantics to LSand-conjoined clauses’, showing the similarities 
among the binding uses of LSand in an IP-conjunction5 (6a), an OM-sentence (6b), and 
conditional if-construction (6c). Thus, firstly we need to delineate OM-constructions 
and other related phenomena. OM-constructions refer to those which take the form of 
[NP and S], which shares some features with other LSand-conjoined constructions and 
paratactic/coordinate conditionals.  
There are also two other linguistic constructions which are closely related to OM-
constructions. The first is the Conditional Conjunction (CC)6. The CC is similar to 
LSand but with a conditional reading as illustrated in examples (7) to (9). Quirk et al. 
(1985) include as types of CC the forms cited as (8) and (9). These are also referred to 
as bare VP CC in Russell (2007) and OM-constructions in Culicover (1970) 
respectively. 
(7)  A fellow gets a few gray hairs, and they think he’s ready for the ashheap.  
                                                              (Bolinger 1967:340) 
(8)  Give me some money and (then) I’ll help you escape.     (Quirk et al. 
1985:931) 
(9)  One more word from you, and I phone the police.                     (ibid.)                     
    
The second related account involves the pseudo-imperative, a term coined by 
Jespersen (1909), which reflects the (pseudo)imperative mood of the first conjunct. 
Russell (2007) discusses the mood forms of the first conjuncts in CCs as follows: 
declarative simple present sentences in (10), non-finite clauses in (11), and bare verb 
phrases in (12). He then summarises two types of CCs, i.e., DaD (a pseudo-declarative 
clause and a future modal declarative clause combined by and) and IaD (an imperative 
clause connected with a declarative clause by and), while he gives no comments on 
non-future second conjunct CCs as (13). 
(10)  John drinks one more can of beer and he’ll be too drunk to drive home.  
(Russell 2007:131)  
(11)  Everyone drink another can of beer and we’ll set a record.             (Ibid) 
(12)  Move a muscle and Frank will shoot you.                         (Ibid:132)         
(13)  Big Louis sees you and he puts a contract out on you.   
(Culicover & Jackendoff 1997: 201) 
 
5 IP refers to an Inflectional Phrase (IP) which is a term used in theoretical syntax to refer to a phrase or clause that 
expresses inflectional information such as tense or agreement; it is roughly equivalent to a finite clause in English.   
6 See Bolinger (1967) for a detailed account of these expressions 
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OM-constructions 7  share features with LSand sentences, CCs and Pseudo-
imperatives since they all may present as non-canonical expressions of conditionals, 
and can be compared to the canonical if-conditional as shown in (14a). The full set is 
repeated here in (14a) to (14d) for illustrative purposes.  
(14a)  If you drink another can of beer, I’m leaving.                     If-Cond                   
(14b)  You drink another can of beer and I’m leaving.        CC/Pseudo-I/ LSand S 
(14c)  Drink another can of beer and I’m leaving.             CC/Pseudo-I/LSand S 
(14d)  One more can of beer and I’m leaving.                      OM/CC/
 LSand S 
                             (based on Culicover & Jackendoff 1997:196-197) 
  Different from the transformational approaches to OM-sentences (e.g., Culicover 
1972; Culicover & Jackendoff 1997), Quirk et al. (1985) follow a Praguian approach 
and take both illocutionary force and speech acts into consideration. They offer a 
functional description of the conditional uses of and in the following two ways: in terms 
of semantics, the conditional use of and performs certain directive speech acts, as a 
promise in (8) and a threat in (9); in terms of grammar, they argue that ‘(i)t is not 
necessary ... for the first clause to be in the imperative mood, or for the second clause 
to contain will or shall’㸦Quirk et al. 1985㸸931), where, for example, the first 
conjunct can be a verbless clause as in (9). From a pragmatic perspective, there is a 
consensus that and is not ‘lexically ambiguous but and-related pragmatic’ (Ariel 
2012:1693). However, it is worth recalling, as noted above, that Culicover & 
Jackendoff (1997) consider there to be a semantic divergence (or mismatch) in the form 
and function of and; i.e., that while LSand is a coordinating conjunction syntactically, it 
is conceptually subordinating.  
Halliday also discusses some conditional uses of and, for example as in (15a), 
explaining that in this example each clause realizes a different speech function where 
the first clause directs a command, and the second expresses an offer (see Halliday & 
Hasan 1985:21). Their combination may look like the simple coordination of two 
clauses given the use of and, which could be re-expressed as (15b). However, the effect 
of the coordination makes (15a) resemble if-conditionals as in (15c), which typically 
expresses a hypotactic rather than paratactic relation given the use of if. The distinction 
between hypotaxis and parataxis will be returned to in more detail below. 
(15a)  (Drink to me only with thine eyes  And I will pledge with mine) 
        Or leave a kiss within the cup     And I’ll not ask for wine 
(15b)  You do8 leave a kiss and I do not ask for wine. 
(15c)  If you leave a kiss within the cup, then I’ll not ask for wine. 
                                           (Halliday & Hasan 1985:20-21) 
 
7 Kay and Michaelis (2012) refer to these as the ‘conjunctional conditional construction’, which they equate with 
Culicover’s examples of the OM-construction.  
8 Emphasis in original 
PƌepƌiŶt ZhaŶg aŶd FoŶtaiŶe, iŶ pƌess 
ϳ 
 
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014:439) propose that ‘[c]ertain mood combinations 
evolved particular meanings’, for example, the combination of an imperative clause and 
a declarative clause can realize a motivated command (warning, advice) or a conditional 
statement. This is illustrated by their example, presented here as (16)9. 
(16) Say something against them || and you will cop a writ, || even though [[what you 
say]] may well be harmless or totally true,’ || he said. [ACE-A]         (ibid.) 
What we can glean from this brief overview of the issues related to the study of the 
OM-construction are four key points of debate. The first relates to the nature of the first 
conjunct, i.e., whether it is a clausal or nominal unit. As mentioned above, Culicover 
(1972) takes the first conjunct in the OM-construction as an NP representing an event, 
but Quirk et al. (1985) treat it as a verbless clause. The status of the first conjunct as a 
NP or a clause determines the nature of the whole OM-construction. For reasons we 
explain below, we argue that the first conjunct is best viewed as a clause.  
The second point relates to the relationship between the OM-construction and If-
conditionals. Culicover argues that the deep structure of and-OM-constructions does 
not involve if-then, but rather and, and that there are no deletion transformations in 
operation with the derivations of such sentences (Culicover 1972). In contrast, Weiser 
(2015) posits that the deep structure of and-OM-constructions does involve if-then, 
suggesting that and-OM-constructions and if-then conditionals are derived from the 
same source. Following Culicover, the precise nature of the relationship between them 
is not as clear as it might seem on the surface. Quirk et al. (1985: 931) believe that there 
is no exact paraphrase relation between CC and if-conditionals. However, some 
scholars, namely Franke (2008) and Zhang (2005), hold that they are the same thing. 
While the literature is inconclusive, we will present our case below for not establishing 
an equivalence between OM-constructions and if-conditionals. 
Thirdly, there remains uncertainly about the semantic determination of OM-
constructions. According to Culicover (1972), the vagueness of OM-constructions 
stems from and itself, whereas Halliday & Matthiessen (2014:439) argue it is due to 
certain mood combinations which evolved for a particular interpersonal role, for 
example, the combination of an imperative clause and a declarative realizes motivated 
command like a warning or advice. Russell (2007) demonstrates that the same OM-
sentence may have quite different understandings if considered in different context. The 
source of the complex meanings of these constructions is clearly debatable but we 
nevertheless make the case for a compromise position where this use of and can be said 
to have evolved from the prototypical additive conjunction under certain circumstances. 
Finally, there is no consensus on the status of the taxis involved, i.e., whether the 
relationship is one of parataxis, as expected with and or hypotaxis, as found with if-
conditionals. Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) attempted to resolve this issue by 
considering the construction to involve both syntactic co-ordination (i.e., parataxis) and 
conceptual subordination (i.e., hypotaxis). In an SFL perspective, we might interpret 
 
9 The notation in this example is as follows: || indicates a clause boundary, and [[ ]] indicates an embedded clause.  
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this as semantic subordination. Halliday & Hasan (1985), Quirk et al. (1985) and 
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) do offer some help in understanding the conditional use 
of and from a functional approach, however, there has not yet been a dedicated study 
of OM-constructions from an SFL approach.  
 
3. A functional perspective on OM-constructions 
 
Turning now to a functional perspective, we will first consider where OM-
constructions can be situated within the rank of grammatical units. Our use of the term 
rank here refers to Halliday’s rank scale (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014: 6), which 
captures the hierarchy of grammatical units (e.g. morpheme, word, phrase/group, 
clause). We then offer a multi-functional explanation to OM-constructions, combined 
with contextual factors.  
3.1. The grammatical nature of the OM-constuction 
SFL views language as a complex system of meaning potential, where paradigmatic 
relations are prioritised. Here meaning is considered in contrastive terms, i.e., meaning 
as choice where choice is central to ‘the modelling of meaning as a function of context’ 
(Author 2: 2013:2). Martin (2017: 23-24) explains that since SFL is a relational theory 
of meaning, paradigmatic relations should be considered in typological terms, i.e., how 
similarities and differences are accounted for and and organised as paradigmatic 
options10. Doing so involves describing how paradigmatic relations are formalized as 
system networks. The clause complex, for example, is considered a univariate unit 
produced through the recursion of clauses at the same rank. As shown in Figure 1, the 
system network for the clause complex contains three simultaneous relational 
subsystems (represented by a brace) which correspond to two kinds of interdependent 
relations, TAXIS and LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE and a system of RECURSION. Each of these 
represents the set of options (shown by a square bracket). The options relate to parataxis 
and hypotaxis in the TAXIS system and expansion and projection in the LOGICO-
SEMANTIC TYPE system. See author 2 et al. (2013) for detail on system notation and a 
thorough discussion of the SFL concept of meaning as choice. 
 
10 In SFL the notion of typology is broader than the general use of the term ‘typology’, which generally relates to 
language types, since it captures a perspective on various contrastive features within a language. Within the SFL 
framework, it is typically viewed in contrast with topology as a complementary perspective on language (see 
Halliday & Matthiessen 1999 for details, especially chapter 2). 
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Fig. 1 The Systems of clause complexing (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014:438) 
How we locate OM-constructions in the English system depends on how we view 
the first half of the OM-construction. There are two theoretical dimensions from SFL 
theory that will be useful in determining this status. The first is that of rank and the 
second is that of metafunction. The principle of instantiation is also relevant as we will 
see in section 4.  
Like most theories, SFL identifies four basic grammatical ranks of unit in English: 
clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme, where each unit is made up of one or more 
of the units immediately below, for example a clause consists of one or more groups. 
At the same time, units of the same rank can be combined together to form a complex.  
However, the key feature of a complex is that it is viewed as a univariate structure 
which by nature involves iteration of the same functional unit. In other words, the only 
way to have a clause complex, is to have an iteration of clauses, i.e., two or more clauses 
combined to form a complex. Similarly a nominal complex would consist of two or 
more nominal groups. According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 434), ‘clause 
complexing always involves assigning clause-hood to a unit related to clause through 
expansion or projection: this unit has the full potential of a clause, in terms of 
experiential, interpersonal and textual systems’. This makes it feasible for the first part 
of the OM-construction to be identified as a clause which is expressed by a nominal 
group and which is combined with a full clause to form a clause complex (cf the 
verbless clause discussed above in Quirk et al.'s (1985) example). The question we are 
faced with then is how a nominal group at clause rank can be differentiated from one at 
group rank. The answer relates to the social semiotic status realized by the unit. 
In the creation of text, we choose between augmenting a clause ‘internally’ 
by means of a circumstantial element and augmenting it ‘externally’ by means 
of another clause in a complex. The decision depends on many factors; but 
the basic consideration has to do with how much textual, interpersonal and 
experiential semiotic ‘weight’ is to be assigned to the unit: the more weight it 
has, the more likely it is to be constructed as an interdependent clause in a 
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clause complex rather than as a circumstantial phrase (or adverbial group) 
augmenting a clause. 
(Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 434㸧 
Within SFL theory, a clause (lexicogrammar) construes a figure (semantic), which is 
realized by a process and one to three participants and potentially one or more 
circumstances. In its function of move, interpersonally, the clause enacts a 
proposition/proposal whereas textually it presents a message. In contrast, semantically, 
the nominal group typically construes a participant, and may also express the functional 
element of Subject interpersonally and Theme textually. OM-constructions encode 
relations between two figures, where the first one is represented by a nominal group (as 
noted by Culicover 1972). However it has the potential of being a clause as noted above. 
This potential is what differentiates it from the typical nominal group which does not, 
i.e., given that nominal groups typically construe a participant (in other words, they 
tend to construe objects semantically rather than events or states), they do not have the 
potential of expressing a figure. The nominal clause of the OM-construction then differs 
from typical nominal groups as we shall see below.   
If we accept that the first part of the construction is a clause, then we can describe 
the OM-construction as a particular type of clause complex comprised of an initial 
clause C1 (expressed in nominal form) and C2 (a full clause). As we will explain below, 
if C1 can be expressed by an elliptical nominal clause, then the OM-construction is 
treated as clause complex, i.e., an expansion of a clause. In terms of metafunction, (i.e., 
clause functions), C1, as a clause, realises some kind of situation in terms of the 
experiential function, it enacts certain interpersonal meanings, and it also presents 
textual meaning, which combines with the second half to form a sequence by the logical 
metafunction. 
  In terms of experiential, interpersonal and textual systems, C1 presents as an elliptical 
clause with partly implicit functional elements. Elliptical clauses are implicit full 
clauses contextually, i.e., in theory the elided elements are recoverable either by (i) 
endophoric ellipsis or ii) exophoric ellipsis. Endophoric ellipsis refers to the 
phenomenon where some part of the clause can be retrieved from the co-text 
anaphorically or cataphorically. According to (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 127), with 
exophoric ellipsis, ‘the clause is not presupposing anything from what has gone before, 
but simply taking advantage of the rhetorical structure of the situation, specifically the 
roles of speaker and listener’. These two types of ellipsis are often exploited in OM-
constructions. In what follows we examine the use of ‘one more lie’ as an instance of 
an OM-construction in order to delve deeper into the functional nature of this 
construction but also to develop the ideas presented so far.  
 
3.2. One more lie 
Example (16) below presents an OM-construction with a grammatically elliptical 
clause. Our position here is that in experiential terms, ‘one more lie’ does not construe 
a thing or a phenomenon as a nominal group typically does, but rather the event of 
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telling one more lie (i.e., it construes a figure) and it is combined with another event in 
C2 to construe a certain semantic sequence in logical terms. In this example both the 
speaker and listener know who is telling ‘one more lie’, in part due to the strong 
collocation between the ‘tell’ and ‘lie’. From the preceding discourse in example (16), 
it is clear that Turner is accusing someone of lying and therefore the utterance ‘one 
more lie’ does not involve Turner but rather his addressee. The most likely recoverable 
form for the OM-construction given in (16) is presented here as (16a), a CC.  
(16)   Turner dragged him to his feet by the hair. He had seen what they had done to 
Patrick and he knew the man was lying. It would make no sense to booby-trap 
the weapon in these circumstances. ‘You're lying.’ Turner showed the man his 
scalpel. ‘One more lie and I'll cut your tongue out.’                 (BNC) 
(16a)  You tell one more lie and I'll cut your tongue out. 
(16b)  In any future instance where you tell one more lie, I’ll cut your tongue out. 
As shown in Table 1 below, the two events construed by figure 1 and figure 2 are 
combined as a clause complex to form a sequence through the prototypical additive 
conjunction and, which logically means that ‘you do something which is unpleasant to 
me and accordingly I’ll do something undesired to you’, and it can be restated as (16b), 
since figure 1 (one more lie) has not happened and it is presupposed with the 
corresponding negative outcome shown in the apodasis.  
Table 1 Analysis of the OM-construction in example (16) 
Sequence figure 1 Relator figure 2 
Ideational  (Sayer Process: 
verbial) 
Verbiage Conjunc
tion 
Actor Process: 
Material 
Goal  
 
 
Interpersonal (S P) C  S F   P C   
clause 
complex 
(You tell) one more 
lie 
and I ’ll  cut  your 
tongue  
out 
Key: S=Subject; P=Predicator; C=Complement; F=Finite; parenthesis indicates ellipsis11 
The interpersonal meaning expressed by the first clause in (16a) helps us to better 
understand the nature of the clause complex. In SFL, the interpersonal perspective 
views language as an exchange of commodity, which means that when the speaker uses 
language to do things, s/he enacts a speech role, e.g., giving or demanding information 
or goods & services, which accordingly expresses a speech function, i.e., statement, 
question, command or offer. In (16), the speaker, Turner, is not asking the man to tell 
one more lie, which means that figure 1 (one more lie) cannot be interpreted as a 
command. Thus, the clause is not an elliptical version of an authentic imperative clause. 
At the same time, figure 1 is used to refer to an irrealis event (i.e., one that has not 
 
11 In SFL, the terms ‘Subject, Predicator, Complement, Finite’ refer to functional elements of the clause from the 
interpersonal metafunction, i.e., they are regarded as expressing interpersonal syntactic functions. 
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happened yet and may never happen or is hypothetical). We can think of this type of 
clause as a pseudo-declarative rather than an elliptical version of a declarative clause 
because its finite status is not recoverable or identifiable (i.e., the finite element has not 
been elided). Furthermore, as we will discuss in detail in section 4, whether or not the 
first clause realizes a speech function is the key to distinguishing parataxis from 
hypotaxis (Verstraete 2007) and therefore in understanding the logical relation between 
the two clauses. Based on this, here we consider the first clause in this example as 
dependent on the second, forming a hypotactic clause complex.  
Furthermore, we might imagine that a response to an OM-construction such as the 
one underlined in (16) might be something like: I won’t (e.g., I won’t tell another lie), 
which indicates the preferred response to the speaker’s command Don’t you lie again, 
i.e., the whole OM-construction may indeed enact a command, but without the use of 
an imperative clause. Therefore, One more lie and I'll cut your tongue out may be 
interpreted as a type of interpersonal metaphor (cf Taverniers 2015), as it involves a 
kind of semantic doubling, where logically we can identify a clause complex, but 
interpersonally the speaker is using it to express a command. The force of the threat is 
much stronger than could be achieved by an if-clause, for example as shown in (16c) 
or indeed by a simple imperative. One more similar example from BNC, (17), supports 
this idea above and it also shows that OM-constructions tend to be more informal. For 
these reasons, OM-constructions must be differentiated from if-clause complexes.  
(16c) If you tell one more lie, then I'll cut your tongue out. 
(17)  Charles says, with relish: ‘I don't know whether a psychologist (sic) would say it 
was the trauma of the divorce but she had real difficulty telling the truth purely 
because she liked to embellish things. On the school run one day the vicar's wife 
stopped the car and said: ‘Diana Spencer, if you tell one more lie like that I am 
going to make you walk home.’ Of course I was triumphant because she had been 
rumbled.’                                                    (BNC)                    
Combined with the textual metafunction, the elided subject, you, of the first clause 
in the OM-construction underlined in (16) is co-referential with the man from preceding 
text: He had seen what they had done to Patrick and he knew the man was lying. The 
use of you in the clause You're lying entails an anaphoric ellipsis in the OM-
construction. We argue that the conditional sense of the OM-construction in (16) 
originates from the combination of the additive meaning of and with the prerequisite 
relation between the two events. This position suggests that the OM-construction in 
(16) is agnate with (16a) but not with the If...then construction in (16c). While they are 
two different grammatical forms, they are constructing closely related meanings, i.e., 
conditional meaning. 
Consequently, the OM-construction in (16) is a hypotactic clause complex formed 
by two clauses combined by and from the perspective of logical metafunction. 
Interpreting the co-text, we can see that the character Turner had realized that there 
would be no sense in booby-trapping the weapon in these circumstances, so he would 
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naturally conclude that the man must be lying and we know that he showed him his 
scalpel when he spoke to him. The clause complex implies a conditioned command, 
i.e., Turner is threatening the man to tell the truth. Comparing (16) and (16a), the 
elliptical nominal clause, one more lie, produces the effect of ‘making continuous 
information non-prominent and contrastive information prominent’ (Matthiessen 
1995:158), while being concise and cohesive with the antecedent clauses. Thus, this 
type of OM-construction can be described functionally as the structure of [Elliptical C1 
irrealis and full C2 futurity], sharing similar experiential and interpersonal meanings with 
CCs, but serving a different textual function.  
 
3.3 The features of the OM-construction 
The detailed discussion of one more lie should not lead us to think that all CCs can 
become OM-constructions through ellipsis or that all OM-constructions have 
corresponding or agnate If...then constructions. There are two main features that capture 
the OM-construction: the first involves a certain logical relation12 which is construed 
between a first clause, C1, expressed by a nominal, and a second clause, C2, expressed 
by a full declarative clause; the second is the fact that C1 construes an irrealis event with 
reference to C2. Some lexical items contribute to realise the irrealis construal of C1 in 
OM-constructions, for example, one more, another, any (other), again, and so on. If we 
revisit Culicover’s beer example originally given as (1), restated here as (18), we can 
consider that the nominal group one more indicates a future perspective on the event 
(i.e., the speaker hasn’t had another can of beer yet). Its hypothetical status helps to 
explain why one more cannot be substituted for a definite determiner such as ‘this’ as 
in (19) because it would ground the nominal referentially to the here and now, 
construing an instance (i.e., an object) and not a future event.  
(18)  Another can of beer and I am leaving. 
(19)  *This can of beer and I am leaving.    
Except for filling in the complement slot, drink one more can of beer, the NP in (1) 
C1 may also be treated as a subject in a different context, for examples, One more can 
of beer hits me and I am leaving, or One can of beer hits me again and I am leaving, 
both indicating a future perspective on the events, too.  
The OM-constructions led by any is another typical form shown by example (20). 
Here, the OM-construction entails a general conditional meaning and we can easily 
understand its full expression as (20a) according to the preceding text. At the same time 
it seems natural if the continuing clause replaces the third person singular present verb 
form goes with the future verb group will go as (20b). Russell (2007) believes that in 
the case of the conditional conjunction of two declarative clauses, or DaD (a declarative 
clause and a declarative clause), the second clause in the DaD is generally restricted 
 
12 See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999:104-105) for their discussion of propositional logic as compared to the natural 
logic of sequences, i.e., the system for reasoning about relations of cause, conditionality, etc. We only discuss 
conditionals in this section as other relations will be discussed in section 4. 
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with a ‘will/would/should + V’ form. However, this is not the whole picture since 
examples (20a) and (20c) with DaD[simple present form] are also acceptable. The whole frame 
construes an irrealis event and its consequent result with reference to the co-text and 
our common sense about a court ordered bond and its violation. In (20), the speaker 
describes and explains her worries and anxieties about the person and it is not hard to 
recognise that the OM-construction paraphrases one part of the court ordered bond as 
the preceding text mentioned (e.g., that she bonded him out with a court ordered bond 
that he should not violate laws and regulations). We argue that Any violation and he 
goes back to jail functions cohesively in this specific context and it achieves the effect 
of expressing the objective restatement of the bond and her unwillingness to see him 
return to jail by using DaD[simple present form], not DaD[modal future form] where modals such as 
will more or less indicate modal meanings. Owing to the objectiveness of simple present 
tense, DaD[simple present form] is quite natural to be used to express general conditionals, 
illustrated by examples (7), (13) and (20).  
(20)  This is so painful, I can't stop crying, I feel like rat snitch. Anyway, after 5 days 
I bonded him out with a court ordered bond that he be released to the custody of 
a drug recovery home and must complete the program. Any violation and he goes 
back to jail. I don't think he wants recovery and will more than likely bolt but 
when they find him he'll do a lot of time in prison and they will find him. What 
a nightmare.                                            (enTenTen15)                    
(20a)  He commits any violation of this bond and he goes back to jail. 
(20b)  He commits any violation of this bond and he will go back to jail.  
(20c)  He commits a violation of this bond and he goes back to jail. 
(20d)  A violation of this bond and he goes back to jail.  
At this point it will be clear that there are other features that contribute to the 
semantics of the construction. Words such as a realise an indefinite singular reference, 
and any indicates the nonassertive meaning and it has the force of conditional (Quirk et 
al. 1985), which clearly influences the meaning. The OM-constructions in (20) might 
be restated as (20c) and (20d), where the indefinite article a is substituted for any, but 
the first clause in (20c) and (20d) might also be analysed as declarative mood realizing 
a statement and has a causal reading with the second conjunct when construing what 
happens to him in other situation.  
It is difficult to re-express the conditional OM-construction in (20) as (20e) below 
because the conditional any differs from superficially nonassertive any when it means 
‘it doesn’t matter which/who/what’ (Quirk et al. 1985). The examples (20f) to (20g), 
as with the OM-construction in (20), do express conditional meaning while they all 
exploit different grammatical resources to fit in different contexts. (20f) and (20g) use 
the conjunctions if and when respectively, whereas (20) originates the contrast of the 
two events connected by and. In other words, the conditional meaning may be realised 
in more than one way, which serves different functions in the text. Due to the similarity 
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of (20a) and (20f), the OM-construction is also considered to involve a hypotactic 
relation.   
(20e)  No matter what violation he commits, he goes back to jail. 
(20f)  If he commits any violation, he goes back to jail.  
(20g)  When he commits a violation, he goes back to jail.  
Building on what we have developed so far, we will now discuss one additional 
example, which illustrates the relationship among OM-constructions, CCs and If...then 
constructions. In short, all of these express conditionals, the choice of which one 
depends on the surrounding circumstances and the co-text and/or context helps us 
determine it.  
The nominal clause A wrong answer in (21) does not realize an independent speech 
function because it does not undertake a command that the speaker demands the listener 
to pick an answer, nor does it provide a statement that the speaker describes an event 
relating to the moment of speaking. It is an elliptical version of the underscored clause 
in (21a), where the two clauses are combined to depict an unreal event and a 
consequence event (the consequence which is dependent on the hypothetical situation).  
 (21)  If there is no player connected, the game continues to run until a new player 
connects, always ready for you to join! The game loops forever and transitions 
between two states: a "lobby" screen that players use to join the game, and a 
"game" screen to hunt for the glyphs. Each glyph requires you to solve a 
riddle: from a list of four words, pick the odd one. A wrong answer and you 
are back to your tent! Good answer? You can get a number of points 
depending on the difficulty of the riddle. The purpose of the game is to run 
forever on a shared screen.                                  (enTenTen15)                         
(21a)  You pick a wrong answer and you are back to your tent!  
(21b)  If you pick a wrong answer, then you are back to your tent!   
Thus, in (21) C1 is bound to C2, you are back to your tent. C1 and C2 combine to form 
a hypotactic clause complex, similar to the if-conditional underscored in (21b). As was 
discussed above, the conditional reading of the OM-construction is not agnate with if 
clause complexes; they serve as two different forms of expressing the sequence of an 
unreal event and a following consequence, although both are expressed by a clause 
complex. The difference among the three types, i.e., the OM-construction in (21), the 
CC in (21a) and the if-conditional in (21b), can be explained by the textual function of 
C1. In (21), the nominal clause, a wrong answer, occurs clause initially and is cohesively 
linked to the odd one in the preceding co-text, which is contrasted with good answer in 
what follows. The function of the paragraph in (21) is to explain the procedures of the 
game and list the two possible results after picking a word, and there is no need to make 
the general subject you to get the initial prominence. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 
432) note, the clauses in a clause complex which represent a semantic sequence of 
temporal succession are only marked by and in some registers such as stories, recounts 
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and procedures which are organized temporally. It may be that this also holds for 
conditional clause complexes when they appear in dialogues, recounts, procedures as it 
contributes to expressing meaning efficiently in the text.  
 A further distinction between OM-constructions and the conditionals discussed 
above relates to the fact that concessive and OM-consctructions rely heavily on the 
semantic contrast between the two events expressed in C1 and C2. In example (22), the 
speaker exploits the semantic contrast between ‘small error’ and ‘you die’. The unusual 
juxtaposition of these two events to express the similar meaning in (22a) highlights the 
speaker’s emphasis on realism.  
(22)  Never before is a car game designed with such emphasis on realism, in bad and    
in a good way. Small error and you die. It could be that you forgot to tighten 
brake linings, or that you forgot to bolt wheels properly.       (enTenTen15) 
 (22a)  Even if you make a small error, you die. 
Based on the discussion above, we can see that in addition to the use of traditional 
condition conjunctions, e.g., if C1, then C2, there are at least three ways to express the 
sequence of a protasis and an apodasis using non-canonical and: (i) grammatically 
using (a) non-finite verbs in C1 as example (11), bare VP as example (12) (see Russell 
2007); (b) the combination of tenses, DaD[future form] or DaD[simple present form], i.e., the 
irrealis or unreal C1 with simple present third singular tense being with reference to the 
future tense of C2 or simple present tense; (ii) by incorporating certain cohesive lexis 
e.g., more, any, another; (iii) through semantic contrast. As illustrated by the examples 
discussed above, the choice of form depends on co-text and context of situation. We 
hold that it is not possible to predict what grammatical restrictions apply to OM-
construction generally because the combination of clauses is in nature a dynamic 
phenomenon. The sequence of an irrealis event followed by a consequent event entails 
a possible conditional meaning, which needs to be scrutinized within its linguistic and 
non-linguistic surroundings.  
 
3.4 An exchange-oriented perspective 
Within SFL, language is considered as social semiotic and in this sense language is 
viewed as dialogic exchange, i.e., people use language to do things, for example, to 
exchange information with other people, ‘to influence their behaviour, to express our 
own viewpoint on things in the world, and to elicit or change theirs’ (Thompson 2014: 
28). What we can draw from this for our current purposes is that the stance the speaker 
takes generally influences the reading of the OM-construction. Recontextualisation can 
help to clarify the ambiguities. We repeat our example (1) from Culicover here as 
example (23) so that we can use different contexts to illustrate the influence this has on 
the construal of the construction.  In what follows, we propose four exchange roles of 
the OM-construction: Prediction, Bargain, Threat and Promise. 
(23)  One more can of beer and I’m leaving.   
Prediction, sequential statements   
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If the aim of the speaker is purely to predict his or her next activities, s/he shows no 
preference towards the two events. In this case, both clauses in example (23) involve 
the speaker as actor (or agent), and the natural logic relation between the two events is 
with reference of time in the physical world, which contributes to the sequential reading 
of the OM-construction, as First I’ll drink one more can of beer, and then I’m leaving. 
The relation between the two clauses is paratactic because they are independent of each 
other, i.e., each can function without the other.  
 
Bargain, a request followed by a statement  
A conditional reading of example (23) may be realized in a different situation， 
where the speaker is supposed to benefit from event one and the listener the beneficent 
from event two. For example, the speaker may use it to bargain for another can of beer 
when he is asked to leave, which would convey the following: Give me one more can 
of beer and then I’m leaving. C1 is regarded as the imperative structure conjoined with 
indicative C2 by the linker and, especially when the speaker says Give me one more can 
of beer accompanied with a gesture of one palm to ask the listener for another beer, 
which indicates s/he directly orders the listener to give him/her goods by pinning the 
request with the situation of context. Since the listener giving one more can of beer to 
the speaker is the prerequisite for the speaker to leave, it also triggers this coordinate 
structure a conditional sense. Here, the clause complex realises a conditional sequence 
of a request and a statement respectively, constructing a paratactic clause complex.   
   
Threat or warning, a conditioned command 
We might imagine another situation where a conditional meaning is implied. For 
example, perhaps John has already drunk too many cans of beer and he is going to open 
another can, but his friend Bob, who thinks that John has had too much to drink, wants 
to stop him from drinking any more. Similar to example (16) above, in this scenario, 
we also find two layers of meaning. There should be co-text or situational context 
contributing to the conditional reading, for example, a preceding clause such as You 
have already had ten cans of beer, or some mention of a large number of empty beer 
cans. If Bob utters example (23) then he is threatening to leave John if John drinks one 
more beer. Here the clause complex is treated as a hypotactic clause complex because 
the first clause does not enact a speech function and cannot realise a proposition or 
proposal of its own.  
 
Promise, a conditioned offer 
Inversely to Threat, it is possible for a speaker to use the OM-construction to make 
a promise to the addressee to do something the speaker would prefer to avoid. We were 
unable to find an attested example in the corpus but we could imagine a scenario where 
two people are at a party which the speaker is enjoying but the addressee is not. In this 
scenario, the party is becoming quite rowdy and someone has thrown a beer can which 
has landed near the addressee. We can imagine that the speaker, who knows the 
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addressee would prefer to leave, turns to the addressee and offers a conditional promise 
as given in (24). In this invented example, the irrealis C1 relates to a potential future 
event which is unpleasant for the addressee, and C2 presents the consequence, which 
the speaker is hoping to avoid. The clause complex is hypotactic since ‘one more flying 
beer can’ does not realize a speech function. This feature differentiates Promise from 
Bargain. Since the offer has a condition attached to it, we refer to it as a conditioned 
offer. 
(24) One more flying beer can and we’re leaving 
The context of situation together with the register features of tenor play a role in 
influencing the semantics of the OM-construction. Taking an interpersonally-oriented 
perspective has allowed us to illustrate four discourse functions of OM-constructions, 
which are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Four functions of OM-constructions  
sequence 
Exchange 
    C1, (irrealis event) 
 
   C2 (consequent event)  
  
Prediction Preference not mentioned Preference not mentioned 
Bargain Desirable to the speaker Desirable to the addressee 
Threat or warning Undesirable to the 
speaker 
Undesirable to the 
addressee 
Promise Undesirable to the 
addressee 
Undesirable to the 
speaker 
 
The conclusion we must draw, therefore, is that it is not only the conjunction and but 
also the logico-semantic meaning together with context which provide the construal of 
the OM-construction.  
 
4. The logical semantics construed by and  
Having discussed the conditional readings of OM-constructions, CCs and If-then 
constructions in the previous section, we now discuss other logical relations between 
the two component parts of the OM-construction, i.e., C1 and C2. 
Within SFL, there are two types of interdependency relations which are involved 
with OM-constructions as indeed there are for all clause complexes. These concern 
taxis (parataxis vs hypotaxis) and logico-semantics (projection vs expansion). These 
two systems are viewed as simultaneous, or in parallel, which means that for every 
clause complex, one feature from each must be selected (and from their sub-systems, 
e.g., expansion is a sub-system with three features as shown in Fig. 1). However, within 
each system, only one option can be selected; in other words, the taxis relation in a 
clause complex cannot express both parataxis and hypotaxis. This view is quite 
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different from the traditional description of clause combinations, where clause 
combinations are simply divided into coordination, which involves linking 
conjunctions such as and, and subordination, which involves binding conjunctions such 
as if. As discussed in section 2, OM-constructions pose a challenge to traditional 
descriptions because the presence of and suggests a paratactic (co-ordinating) relation.  
While there has been considerable research on bare VP conditional conjunctions as 
a pseudo-imperative, e.g., Say one more word and I’ll scream! (Franke 2008: 261), little 
attention has been given to the interdependency relations of OM-constructions. We hold 
that extending OM-constructions involve a paratactic relation, while enhancing ones 
may be either paratactic or hypotactic depending on the context of use.  
In SFL the clause complex is viewed as expansion, i.e., one clause serves as an 
expansion of another clause. There are three types of expansion: elaboration, extension 
and enhancement (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). For Halliday, and is a 
prototypical marker of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 471) and has an 
additive function (e.g., He’d been a medieval history student in college and I was 
interested in medieval literature, too p. 472). When and appears in other than the 
additive function, it is typically combined with other conjuncts or adjuncts. For 
example, temporal (and meanwhile), spatial (and there), manner (and in that way), 
cause-conditional (and still) enhancement, where and is often optional (see Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2014 for details).  
  According to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 480), ‘a sequence of paratactic clauses 
which have to be interpreted as being in some circumstantial relation to each other, 
especially a temporal sequence, is marked simply by and, without any further 
conjunctive expression’. This statement would then hold for the enhancing 
interpretation of and. The data we collected from the corpora (see above) confirm this 
tendency. As we will now discuss, our data shows evidence of and in extending and 
enhancing clause expansion.  
4.1 Extension  
With extension, one clause adds something new which extends the meaning of 
another clause, such as an addition, a replacement, or an alternative. And is a 
prototypical paratactic marker of additive extension, as exemplified in the underscored 
sentence in (25). 
 
(25)  But I know there were more than three crashes here. I can think of at least one 
more crash. I can also remember a guy died here last year. Right here. He 
crashed his motorcycle. He layed it down and skid into a truck. No helmet and 
he was pretty drunk. He would have been a senior with me this year.                         
(                                                   (enTenTen15) 
Furthermore, as we can see in an example such as (26), and can also be used to relate 
adversative extension clauses, where it takes a reading similar to but. Here, the speaker 
uses it to link two clauses to express her compliment on Helm’s first docking attempt 
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when compared to her own. The adversative use of and in OM-constructions, with 
preference in spoken English language, usually has the effect of showing the speaker’s 
feelings and attitudes, such as surprise, anger, or criticism, as shown in (26), (27) and 
(28), where examples are underscored.  
(26)  "Well done, Helm! First time and you didn't shear off an antenna or anything, 
I'm impressed! " Rishov laughed, "You should have seen my first docking 
attempt.                                                       (enTenTen15)   
(27)  My only pen and you went and lost it.                   (Culicover 1970:368) 
(28)  Twenty-five centuries of language teaching and what have we learned.  (ibid.) 
4.2 Enhancement 
As was mentioned above, and is a prototypical paratactic marker of addition 
extension, which can also be used to relate enhancement clauses including sequence, 
causal, conditional, when combined with conjunctive expressions, such as (and) then, 
(and) so, (and) yet shown above; the brackets here indicate that and is optional. The 
reason why Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) interpret these nexus as paratactic 
enhancing ones lies in the fact that firstly they have a corresponding hypotactic version 
which involves an enhancing dependent clause and secondly and is optional. However, 
simple and, i.e., without any further conjunctive expression, is frequently used to link 
paratactic clauses being in circumstantial relation, especially a temporal sequence 
(Halliday & Matthiessen: 2014:480). These examples of OM-constructions 
demonstrate not only sequential nexus but causal and conditional relations as well.  
Sequential OM-constructions are sequential in terms of the time reference to the 
conjoined events and have corresponding agnate major clauses which share equal 
status. For this reason, they are analyzed as paratactic expansion. For example, in (29) 
the OM-construction can be considered agnate with There is only one more weekend to 
go and the security screen could be lifted. In (30) the OM-construction may be 
alternatively expressed as We had a firm handshake and he wastes no time getting down 
to business, and in (31) the OM-construction agnates with He takes another sip and he's 
looking back up at the man-offering on stage. These OM-constructions allow and to be 
substituted with and then to make the sequential sense explicit.   
(29)  He was relieved from duty by the end of the week. One more weekend and the 
security screen could be lifted. Two men had been arrested in Liverpool and their 
informer in Belfast named them as the assassins. Once this was established, Neil 
Fraser and the other two targets would be low risks as usual.         ˄BNC  ˅
(30)  At 1.30 in the night, Abhi (as we love to call him) arrives in his booked room at 
the Rennaisance Powai Hotel where I am waiting for him along with his personal 
PR, Shalmana, who's giving me company since 10pm. A firm handshake and he 
wastes no time getting down to business. Abhi has just returned after finishing 
his first shot for the film Game he is filming along with actress Kangna Ranaut 
in the hotel.                    
(enTenTen15)   
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(31)  He offers a friendly wave to Perdy and smiles to Sammy. A curious look is sent 
Elisha's way. But, he doesn't pursue it. Another sip and he's looking back up at 
the man-offering on stage. Poor bastard, his look suggests.       (enTenTen15)  
OM-constructions may also construe a cause-and-effect link in the sequence of the 
events as shown in (32). The clausal relation in this case is paratactic in status. 
(32)  The person responsible sent me an email and was extremely apologetic. Since he 
just bought his car this summer, he wanted to make a side deal. No insurance 
involvement and he would pay me directly. I said I was open to that since the car 
is 10 years old and it would be easy to for me to fix it. I found the parts online 
and gave him a rough estimate.                               (enTenTen15)   
As concerns its use in OM-constructions, and has a tendency to occur on its own and 
we find it used for most types of expansion, including sequential, causal and conditional 
sequences. Outside of OM-constructions, with the exception of additive extension, and 
is an optional conjunction in formal style and where it is used, it co-occurs with other 
conjunctive expressions, e.g., ‘and yet’ in adversative extension (see Halliday & 
Matthiessen, 2014). As discussed above, Culicover (2013) treats differences in uses of 
and as semantic ambiguities of the OM-construction. We suggest here that by 
considering the interpersonal functions of the clauses involved, we can delineate one 
reading from other possible readings of the OM-construction.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This study has re-examined OM-constructions from a functional perspective. The 
paper set out to shed some light on this construction by locating OM-constructions in 
the English system as clause complexes in which the first clause may be elliptical, 
arguing that OM-constructions cannot be equated with If-conds, although both 
constructions may be used to realize very similar meanings, i.e., conditionals. We 
further showed that non-canonical and evolved from the prototypical additive 
conjunction and under certain circumstances. In general, extensive and temporal 
enhancing OM-constructions are paratactic while conditional enhancing ones may be 
paratactic or hypotactic, which depends on whether the clause in the protasis realizes a 
specific speech function or not. Thirdly, with the combination of a lexicogrammatical 
and a contextual analysis, we have been able to show that it was not only the 
conjunction and but also the logico-semantic meaning together with context which 
enabled us to account for the construal of the OM-construction. The multi-functional 
and multi-stratal framework of SFL has shown how promising the framework is for 
dealing with challenging constructions. As Butler & Gonzálvez-García (2014:488) 
have concluded, one the strengths of SFL is accounting for the structure and properties 
of extended stretches of discourse. The combination of lexicogrammar with text 
properties can provide a convincing description than either discourse analysis or 
syntactic analysis alone.  
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Our examination of OM-constructions in English has provided a plausible account 
of the nature of these expressions which can be situated within a functional framework. 
Importantly, we have identified key areas for future work. The role of aspectual 
semantics, both lexical and grammatical, was shown to be significant and the exact 
nature of this role should be explored in detail, for example how items such as again 
and more contribute to the OM-construction. Future work in this area will no doubt be 
fruitful as it will lead to a much better understanding of the pragmatic inferences 
involved in these constructions. Finally, it is clear that register factors contribute to the 
interpretation of the OM-construction but this has yet to be fully explored. This is 
understandable in part because of the difficulty in building a suitable corpus for this 
type of research. However, what we have shown here is that it can be done and that this 
approach does lead to greater insights into the nature of the construction.       
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